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OUR RECORDS PANOPTICON AND THE AMERICAN
BAR ASSOCIATION STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL
JUSTICE
STEPHEN E. HENDERSON*
“Secrets are lies. Sharing is caring. Privacy is theft.”1 So concludes
the main character in Dave Egger’s novel, The Circle, in which a single
company that unites Google, Facebook, and Twitter—and on steroids—has
the ambition not only to know, but also to share, all of the world’s
information. It is telling that a current dystopian novel features not the
government in the first instance, but instead a private third party that,
through no act of overt coercion, knows so much about us. This is indeed
the greatest risk to privacy in our day, both the unprecedented, massive
collection and retention by third parties of private information, and then
* Professor of Law, the University of Oklahoma College of Law; B.S. in Electrical
Engineering, University of California at Davis; J.D., Yale Law School. I am grateful to the
symposium participants for bringing their expertise to Norman, Oklahoma, and to my
colleague Joseph Thai for moderating the symposium panels. I am likewise grateful to the
members of the Oklahoma Law Review for their exceptional planning, for the hospitality
provided to our guests, and for their hard work in editing this symposium volume. In
particular, I thank Editor-in-Chief Selby Brown, Symposium Editor Charles Knutter, and
Assistant Symposium Editor Amanda Lee.
1. DAVE EGGERS, THE CIRCLE 303 (2013). For a fun, albeit distressing, summary of
arguments against privacy, see id. at 276-304. In a nutshell, if there were no privacy, there
would be little to no crime: Why do the crime when you know not only that you will “do the
time,” serving any set penalty, but that you will also suffer immediate and certain social
approbation? Id. at 280. Moreover, if all were known, it would prevent people from
forming a misleading impression of others based only on knowing a few characteristics or
events. See id. at 286-87. As for those things we are embarrassed for others to see, one of
two things will allegedly happen: either that behavior will be found sufficiently normal that
we will no longer be embarrassed, or it will become clear that the behavior actually is
deviant and so we should stop. Id. at 288. Google CEO Eric Schmidt seems to be a
believer: “If you have something that you don’t want anyone to know, maybe you shouldn’t
be doing it in the first place.” Cade Metz, Google Chief: Only Miscreants Worry About Net
Privacy, REGISTER (Dec. 7, 2009), http://www.theregister.co.uk/2009/12/07/schmidt_on_
privacy/ (quoting Eric Schmidt). And why is privacy theft? Because you steal from those
who could otherwise have vicariously experienced through you, including those physically,
mentally, financially, or otherwise unable to do so on their own. See EGGERS, supra, at 299304.
Missing from all of these proffered arguments, of course, is the remarkable richness of
varied and unique personal relationships, all the experimenting and growth that those
relationships encourage, and all the joy and carefree spontaneity they bring to what could
otherwise be a remarkably unfriendly and dreary existence.
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secondarily the access to that information by others, including law
enforcement. For the past seven years, from 2006 to 2013, I served as the
Reporter in drafting the black letter and commentary to what is now the
twenty-fifth volume of the American Bar Association Standards for
Criminal Justice, this volume relating to law enforcement access to third
party records. Considering the talent that served on the Task Force and
Standards Committee, and the significant vetting of the ABA process, it
would be surprising if the Standards did not get many things right, and
hopefully that is evident in the Standards themselves. But inevitably any
first-of-its-kind project of this magnitude will be imperfect and incomplete.
Continuing to move the conversation forward was my purpose in
organizing this Symposium. The articles in this volume are a testament to
its success, and here I explain the drafting of the Standards, including a few
substantive highlights, and place the Standards in their unique historic
context. We have begun to capture, record, and analyze everything within
given domains, as opposed to selectively preserving only what is
contemporaneously considered relevant or necessary. As we step into this
brave new world, the Standards have great value not only to our
democratic decision makers, but to all of us, as we seek to reap its benefits
without sacrificing our privacy, and with that privacy our individuality and
even our personhood.
I. The World in Which We Live
In late 2006, the American Bar Association (ABA) Criminal Justice
Standards Committee appointed a Task Force to draft a new set of Criminal
Justice Standards, this one relating to Law Enforcement Access to Third
Party Records (LEATPR Standards).2 The new Standards would constitute
a new volume in the ABA Standards for Criminal Justice, a massive project
that had begun just over forty years earlier, in 1964, when it would have
been almost impossible to imagine how much information humanity now
stores.3 In their book Big Data, Viktor Mayer-Schönberger & Kenneth
Cukier present a telling example from the field of astronomy:

2. See ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: LAW ENFORCEMENT ACCESS TO THIRD
PARTY RECORDS (2013) [hereinafter LEATPR STANDARDS]. Individual standards will be referred
to using the format ‘Standard x-x.’ The black letter Standards are reproduced in this volume as an
Appendix, and the entire Standards volume is available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/
dam/aba/publications/criminal_justice_standards/third_party_access.authcheckdam.pdf.
3. See Martin Marcus, The Making of the ABA Criminal Justice Standards: Forty
Years of Excellence, CRIM. JUST., Winter 2009, at 10, 10.
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When the Sloan Digital Sky Survey began in 2000, its telescope
in New Mexico collected more data in its first few weeks than
had been amassed in the entire history of astronomy. By 2010
the survey’s archive teemed with a whopping 140 terabytes of
information. But a successor, the Large Synoptic Survey
Telescope in Chile, due to come on stream in 2016, will acquire
that quantity of data every five days.4
One terabyte is 1012 bytes (1,000,000,000,000 bytes) and has become a
standard size for personal computer hard drives, despite being more
computer memory than was available on Earth a mere fifty years ago.5 To
provide some perspective, a single character can be stored as a byte,
meaning an article like this one written in a text editor would fill on the
order of 70,000 bytes, or .00000007 terabytes.6 An image file might
occupy one megabyte, or .000001 terabytes. The Large Hadron Collider,
the world’s highest-energy particle accelerator, generates data on an even
more impressive scale than our telescopes. When in operation, it generates
up to six gigabytes of data every second, meaning one terabyte in under
three minutes.7
Science has provided similarly impressive techniques to gather
information about ourselves. The human genome project required a decade
to sequence the three billion base pairs at a cost of $2.7 billion.8 Today that
sequencing can be completed in a day at a cost of $3000.9 A life logger,
meaning one who attempts to self-record all of his experience, generates
over a terabyte of data a year.10 And while they might be far less

4. VIKTOR MAYER-SCHÖNBERGER & KENNETH CUKIER, BIG DATA: A REVOLUTION
THAT WILL TRANSFORM HOW WE LIVE, WORK, AND THINK 7 (2013).
5. The People’s Panopticon, ECONOMIST, Nov. 16, 2013, at 27. Of course, digital
memory operates in binary, so the same term can also refer to 240 bytes (the number two
multiplied by thirty-nine other twos), a slightly different number but of the same order of
magnitude. The two conventions are used interchangeably (and sometimes confusingly) for
lesser amounts of data, but typically the decimal convention is used for larger amounts.
6. An article written in a program other than a text editor will include data on character
formatting (e.g., to account for font size and italics), and thus will be a larger file. One byte
is 8 bits, meaning it can contain the numbers 0 to 255, because 28=256.
7. Magnetic Tape to the Rescue, ECONOMIST, Nov. 30, 2013, at 3 [hereinafter Magnetic
Tape].
8. MAYER-SCHÖNBERGER & CUKIER, supra note 4, at 7; Steve Lohr, Sizing Up Big
Data, N.Y. TIMES, June 20, 2013, at F1.
9. MAYER-SCHÖNBERGER & CUKIER, supra note 4, at 7; Lohr, supra note 8, at F1.
10. The People’s Panopticon, supra note 5.
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impressive as a matter of hard science,11 social networking and other online
activity amply demonstrate the huge amount of data we collectively
generate:
Google processes more than 24 petabytes [24,000 terabytes] of
data per day, a volume that is thousands of times the quantity of
all printed material in the U.S. Library of Congress. Facebook, a
company that didn’t exist a decade ago, gets more than 10
million new photos uploaded every hour. Facebook members
click a ‘like’ button or leave a comment nearly three billion
times per day . . . . [T]he 800 million monthly users of Google’s
YouTube service upload over an hour of video every second.
The number of messages on Twitter grows at around 200 percent
a year and by 2012 had exceeded 400 million tweets a day.12
When it comes to uploading video, YouTube is not even the biggest
game in town. Users of Dropcam upload over 1000 hours of video a
minute13 as they use surveillance cameras to “[n]ever miss a moment this
year.”14
The amazing breadth and depth of stored information was very much on
our minds as we began drafting the new set of ABA Standards in 2007.
Nonetheless, it is remarkable to think on how much more information is
stored in 2013, the year I completed drafting the Commentary. While
estimating the world’s stored information is difficult and uncertain, Martin
Hilbert and Priscila López calculate that in 2007 there were approximately
300 exabytes (meaning 300 million terabytes) of stored data.15 The amount
of analog information hardly grows at all, but the amount of digital data
11. See Jason Pontin, Why We Can’t Solve Big Problems, MIT TECH. REV., Oct. 24,
2012, available at http://www.technologyreview.com/featuredstory/429690/why-we-cantsolve-big-problems/. The cover of this edition intriguingly features a picture of Astronaut
Buzz Aldrin with the headline, “You Promised Me Mars Colonies. Instead, I Got
Facebook.” MIT TECH. REVIEW, Oct. 24, 2012, at front cover, available at http://digital.
technologyreview.com/?iid=69328#folio=1.
12. MAYER-SCHÖNBERGER & CUKIER, supra note 4, at 8.
13. Quentin Hardy, Today’s Webcams See All (Tortoise, We’re Watching Your Back),
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 7, 2014, at A1.
14. DROPCAM, https://www.dropcam.com/ (last visited Mar. 19, 2014).
15. Martin Hilbert & Priscila López, The World’s Technological Capacity to Store,
Communicate, and Compute Information, SCIENCE, Apr. 1, 2011, at 60, 62. Hilbert and
López define storage as “the maintenance of information over a considerable amount of time
for explicit later retrieval.” Id. at 60; see also Martin Hilbert & Priscila López, The World’s
Technological Capacity to Process Information, MARTINHILBERT.NET, http://www.martin
hilbert.net/WorldInfoCapacity.html (last visited Nov. 30, 2013).
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doubles approximately every three years.16 Thus, in 2013, Hilbert estimates
the amount of stored information in the world at around 300 exabytes times
2 times 2, or 1200 exabytes.17 That is over one billion terabytes. Others
estimate the amount of stored data grows even faster, doubling every two
years,18 while the capacity of the fastest way to communicate it, fiber optic
cables, doubles every nine months.19
To put a less technical face to this, in 2010 Eric Schmidt, CEO of
Google, explained that every two days (and by now perhaps every day) we
produce more information than was produced over the entire course of
civilization up to the year 2003.20 Thus, every two days of global data
production equals or exceeds the amount of information contained in all of
the conversations that have ever taken place.21
These numbers are mindboggling, and it will require the novel
techniques of big data22 to make sense of information on such massive

16. MAYER-SCHÖNBERGER & CUKIER, supra note 4, at 9 (describing the work of
Hilbert).
17. Id.
18. See JOHN GANTZ & DAVID REINSEL, THE DIGITAL UNIVERSE IN 2020: BIG DATA,
BIGGER DIGITAL SHADOWS, AND BIGGEST GROWTH IN THE FAR EAST 1 (2012), available at
http://idcdocserv.com/1414 (predicting a doubling every two years); Michiko Kakutani,
Watched by the Web: Surveillance Is Reborn, N.Y. TIMES, June 11, 2013, at C1; Magnetic
Tape, supra note 7 (referencing such an estimate).
19. ERIC SCHMIDT & JARED COHEN, THE NEW DIGITAL AGE: RESHAPING THE FUTURE OF
PEOPLE, NATIONS, AND BUSINESS 5 (2013).
20. MG Siegler, Eric Schmidt: Every 2 Days We Create as Much Information as We
Did Up to 2003, TECHCRUNCH (Aug. 4, 2010), http://techcrunch.com/2010/08/04/schmidtdata/.
21. Id.; see also Lohr, supra note 8.
22. There is not a single definition of “big data”:
Initially the idea was that the volume of information had grown so large that the
quantity being examined no longer fit into the memory that computers use for
processing, so engineers needed to revamp the tools they used for analyzing it
all. . . . One way to think about the issue today . . . is this: big data refers to
things one can do at a large scale that cannot be done at a smaller one, to
extract new insights or create new forms of value, in ways that change markets,
organizations, the relationship between citizens and governments, and more.
MAYER-SCHÖNBERGER & CUKIER, supra note 4, at 6.
Big Data is a vague term, used loosely, if often, these days. But put simply, the
catchall phrase means three things. First, it is a bundle of technologies.
Second, it is a potential revolution in measurement. And third, it is a point of
view, or philosophy, about how decisions will be – and perhaps should be –
made in the future.
Lohr, supra note 8, at F1.
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scales. But if we step back and think of our everyday experiences, it is easy
to see that very significant information about each of us is recorded by third
parties that used to be recorded by no one. Whereas I used to pay cash for
many purchases, today I buy nearly everything in an identified and recorded
manner. And it is not merely what I ultimately purchase that is recorded.
Retail store, library, and bookstore browsing are traditionally transient and
anonymous, but today I browse online where everything is potentially
recorded, from how long I look at a page to where my mouse hovers.23 Nor
will offline, brick-and-mortar store browsing remain anonymous, since high
definition store cameras can record a shopper’s every move, including
using facial recognition to determine ethnicity and identity.24 And whether
we are shopping online or off, soon eye-tracking technology will be able to
track and record where our eyes linger as we browse.25
Dictionary and encyclopedia browsing are transient and anonymous, but
I do these online too. Google knows the words I cannot spell or define as I
take advantage of my always-on and always-available connections, from
my desktop computer to my iPad to my smartphone.26 My service
providers know and can record everything I do online, and other tracking
companies try to learn the same.27 The broadcast television of my youth

23. Lohr, supra note 8, at F1; Steve Rosenbush, Facebook Tests Software to Track Your
Cursor on Screen, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 30, 2013), http://blogs.wsj.com/cio/2013/10/30/
facebook-considers-vast-increase-in-data-collection/.
24. Stephanie Clifford & Quentin Hardy, Attention, Shoppers: Store Is Tracking Your
Cell, N.Y. TIMES, July 15, 2013, at A1; Stephanie Rosenbloom, In Bid to Sway Sales,
Cameras Track Shoppers, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 19, 2010, at A1; We Snoop to Conquer,
ECONOMIST, Feb. 9, 2013, http://www.economist.com/news/business/21571452-securitycameras-are-watching-honest-shoppers-too-we-snoop-conquer.
25. See The Eyes Have It, ECONOMIST, Dec. 1, 2012, http://www.economist.com/news/
technology-quarterly/21567195-computer-interfaces-ability-determine-location-personsgaze; The All-Telling Eye, ECONOMIST, Oct. 22, 2011, http://www.economist.com/node/
21533362.
26. Spelling Corrections and Suggestions, GOOGLE GUIDE, http://www.googleguide.
com/spelling_corrections.html (last visited Mar. 19, 2014).
27. For example, we know that when we visit a website, our browser will often
differently color those links that we have previously visited. Some data aggregators have
sought to take advantage of this by embedding code in sites to which they have access that
thereby surreptitiously determines what other sites one has visited. See Mathew J. Swartz,
Dataium Settles Browser History Sniffing Charges, INFORMATIONWEEK (Nov. 26, 2013),
http://www.informationweek.com/security/compliance/dataium-settles-browser-history-sniff
ing-charges/d/d-id/1112817. Other companies use all sorts of other methods to track online
activity. See, e.g., Kate Murphy, How to Muddy Your Tracks on the Internet, N.Y. TIMES,
May 2, 2012, at B7; Tracking the Trackers: Our Method, WALL ST. J., July 31, 2010,
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was anonymously viewed, but now I consume media from providers who
record what I watch and when I watch it.28 Even the solitary reading of a
good book has become a shared spectacle. When I delve into an e-book,
the “data exhaust” of such reading is shared and tracked on an incredibly
nuanced scale: where I read, when I read, how long I spend on a page, what
words I look up in the built-in dictionary, and anything I highlight (and as a
consequence, I don’t highlight).29
How about that weekend drive? Ford Motor Company’s top sales
executive recently made headlines when he bragged, “We know everyone
who breaks the law. We know when you’re doing it. We have GPS in your
car, so we know what you’re doing.”30 And it is not merely your car
manufacturer who is watching. The weekend drive is potentially now
shared with the insurance company seeking to keep an eye on my driving,31
the cell phone provider needing to know the location of my phone,32 and the
navigation app helping me on my way.33 At least portions are shared with
others, such as toll-tag operators, license plate readers, stationary cameras,
the life-logger driving behind me, and the drone hobbyist flying his new
toy.
While I have resisted in a futile attempt at maintaining some control,
many have taken advantage of the benefits of remote access and robust
backup by moving what used to be stored only on a personal computer into
the internet cloud.34 In short, we share a great deal about our lives with
others, and this trend will only accelerate with the impending “internet of
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052748703977004575393121635952084
(discussing three of the fifty most common tracking methods).
28. Neal Ungerleider, How Big Data Keeps Cable TV Watchers Hooked, FAST COMPANY
(Jan. 14, 2013), http://www.fastcompany.com/3004619/how-big-data-keeps-cable-tv-watchershooked.
29. See MAYER-SCHÖNBERGER & CUKIER, supra note 4, at 113 (explaining the genesis
of the term “data exhaust”).
30. Jaclyn Trop, The Next Data Privacy Battle May Be Waged Inside Your Car, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 11, 2014, at B1 (quoting Jim Farley).
31. Brad Tuttle, Big Data Is My Copilot: Auto Insurers Push Devices That Track
Driving Habits, TIME (Aug. 6, 2013), http://business.time.com/2013/08/06/big-data-is-mycopilot-auto-insurers-push-devices-that-track-driving-habits/.
32. Jessica Leber, How Wireless Carriers Are Monetizing Your Movements, MIT TECH.
REV. (Apr. 12, 2013), http://www.technologyreview.com/news/513016/how-wireless-carriersare-monetizing-your-movements/.
33. See id.
34. Joe Baguley, How Cloud Computing Is Changing the World . . . Without You
Knowing, GUARDIAN, Sept. 24, 2013, http://www.theguardian.com/media-network/medianetwork-blog/2013/sep/24/cloud-computing-changing-world-healthcare.
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things,” in which devices like lights, thermostats, and security cameras are
already internet connected, and soon everything from our refrigerators to
our running shoes will be as well.35 Even data that seemingly has no utility
is retained in “data tombs,” because storage is cheap and the analytics of
big data are teaching that new and valuable uses of old data may be just
around the corner.36
There is certainly an appetite for information.37 In perhaps what will
become the classic story of the dawn of the big data era, Charles Duhigg
chronicled how Target’s analytics department managed to piece together
when a customer is pregnant.38 Reeling in pregnant shoppers can pay big
dividends because such a significant life event shakes up our otherwise
routine habits.39 So when Target’s analytics determined that, for example,
pregnant women around the beginning of their second trimester purchase
increased quantities of unscented lotion, the retailer was able to mine
seemingly routine and benign purchase data to predict which customers
might be pregnant, scoring them on a “pregnancy prediction” scale and
generating a list of tens of thousands of likely pregnant customers.40 The
store’s initial blunderbuss targeted advertising raised the ire of the father of
a teenager, understandably perturbed that the store would send his daughter
personalized advertisements clearly intended for those who were
expecting.41 But when the store manager called to apologize, the father was
contrite; it turned out there were things happening in his home of which he
was unaware.42

35. On the internet of things, see, for example, Jesse Emspak, Smart Shoes Could Help
Runners Hit Their Stride, LIVESCIENCE (Dec. 10, 2013), http://www.livescience.com/41844smart-running-shoes-improve-runners-gait.html; Brad Spurgeon, Racing into an
Interconnected Future, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 21, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/21/
sports/autoracing/racing-into-an-interconnected-future.html?pagewanted=all; Bob Sullivan,
The ‘Internet of Things’ Pits George Jetson vs. George Orwell, NBC NEWS, June 29, 2013,
http://www.nbcnews.com/technology/internet-things-pits-george-jetson-vs-george-orwell-6C.
10462818.
36. MAYER-SCHÖNBERGER & CUKIER, supra note 4, at 98-104.
37. “[B]ecause Internet companies could collect vast troves of data and had a burning
financial incentive to make sense of them, they became the leading users of the latest
processing technologies, superseding offline companies that had, in some cases, decades
more experience.” Id. at 6.
38. Charles Duhigg, Psst, You in Aisle 5, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 19, 2002, at MM30.
39. See id. (“[N]ew parents are a retailer’s holy grail.”).
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
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More recently, thanks to Edward Snowden, we have become aware of
the massive data surveillance of the National Security Agency, “an
electronic omnivore of staggering capabilities.”43 While some portions
have been crafty “first person” surveillance, such as the NSA hacking
internet security and corrupting cell phones in order to track them even
when powered down,44 many of the revelations relate to the NSA obtaining
data from third parties. Some of that third party gathering has been overt,
such as gathering all telephone metadata,45 and some covert, such as
gathering cloud storage data as providers transfer it among their own data
centers.46 But either way, this third party surveillance relies upon the
breadth of personal information now residing with third parties.47
43. Scott Shane, No Morsel Too Miniscule for All-Consuming N.S.A., N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 3,
2013, at A1. For more on the connection between big data and the NSA, see James Risen &
Nick Wingfield, Silicon Valley and Spy Agency Bound by Strengthening Web, N.Y. TIMES,
June 20, 2013, at A1. And the revelations keep coming. See, e.g., Geoff White, Revealed: UK
and US Spied on Text Messages of Brits, CHANNEL 4 NEWS, Jan. 17, 2014, http://www.
channel4.com/news/intercept-text-messages-spy-nsa-gchq-british-phone (documenting NSA
gathering of 200 million text messages a day).
44. See Nicole Perlroth et al., N.S.A. Able to Foil Basic Safeguards of Privacy on Web,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 6, 2013, at A1; Shane, supra note 43, at A1; Jill Scharr, NSA Tracks
Turned-Off Phones – But Phone Makers Don’t Know How, TOM’SGUIDE (Nov. 12, 2013),
http://www.tomsguide.com/us/nsa-track-off-mobiles,news-17851.html.
45. See Charlie Savage, A.C.L.U. Files Lawsuit to Stop the Collection of Domestic
Phone Logs, N.Y. TIMES, June 12, 2013, at A18. For a cogent analysis of the program’s
legality, see David S. Kris, On the Bulk Collection of Tangible Things, LAWFARE RESEARCH
PAPER SERIES, Sept. 29, 2013, at 1, http://www.lawfareblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/
09/Lawfare-Research-Paper-Series-No.-4-2.pdf. At its core, the NSA argument that Patriot
Act section 215 was meant to permit the preservation of all third party records on the basis
that some miniscule fraction might prove useful at a future time is tenuous. Were Congress
to permit such staggeringly broad collection, one would expect—and we should demand—
that it then debate the chilling effect this will have, the necessary security precautions for
such a database including audit controls and punishments for breaches, the justifications for
accessing that database, etc. It is a stretch to think that even our too-often dilatory Congress
meant to leave all of those critical matters undecided, implicitly authorizing the secret
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court to draft all of the critical design elements. This is
not to say, however, that such appropriately defined authorization would necessarily be illadvised. See, e.g., Christopher Slobogin, Cause to Believe What?: The Importance of
Defining a Search’s Object—Or, How the ABA Would Analyze the NSA Metadata
Surveillance Program, 66 OKLA. L. REV. 725, 738-39 (2014) (applying ABA LEATPR
Standards to NSA collection).
46. See Barton Gellman & Ashkan Soltani, NSA Infiltrates Links to Yahoo, Google Data
Centers Worldwide, Snowden Documents Say, WASH. POST, Oct. 30, 2013, http://
www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/nsa-infiltrates-links-to-yahoo-google-datacenters-worldwide-snowden-documents-say/2013/10/30/e51d661e-4166-11e3-8b74-
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So, what was clear in 2007 as we began drafting the ABA Standards is
even clearer today: there is a great need for a coherent, methodical
approach to the regulation of law enforcement access to third party
information. The LEATPR Standards are the first to articulate such a
framework. Before turning to a brief explanation of their drafting process,
it is worth spending a moment more on why all of this matters.
The Standards Commentary, including that to Standard 25-3.3, defines
and explains the importance of information privacy. That privacy, meaning
for each of us the right to control what information about us is conveyed to
others and for what purposes, is of course much larger than merely the issue
of law enforcement access. It is central to human development and dignity,
and should restrict third parties as well. Yet only the government can force
disclosure of information unrestrained by market and other pressures, and
the ABA Standards for Criminal Justice are inherently limited to
considering this subset.
But a subset it is, meaning law enforcement access to third party records
is a meaningful component of the larger issue. And in this larger context
Viktor Mayer-Schönberger has made important insights, including that
“[m]emory impedes change.”48 In his 2009 book, Delete, MayerSchönberger beautifully empathizes the human experience, an experience
that for each of us is often tolerable—and even wonderful—only because
we can change. An all-recording and all-remembering digital society could
effectively stifle that opportunity:
I fear the real bottleneck of conflating history and collapsing
time is not digital memory, but human comprehension. Even if
we were presented with a dossier of facts, neatly sorted by date,
in our mind we would still have difficulties putting things in the
right temporal perspective, valuing facts properly over time. . . .
From the perspective of the person remembering, digital memory
d89d714ca4dd_story.html. In retrospect, it is rather remarkable that these cloud providers
thought to encrypt data sent to and from the customer, but not when transmitted among their
own disparately located servers.
47. Like many, I am critical of much of the NSA surveillance, but I am not as distrustful
of the institutional motives. When there are no external restraints, it is logical to gather
absolutely everything one can subject only to resource restraints; in the world of intelligence,
who knows what will ultimately prove useful? But of course well-intentioned surveillance
can be almost equally destructive to social participation and free society, and thus we must
figure out how to implement proper restraints without hobbling our intelligence apparatus.
48. VIKTOR MAYER-SCHÖNBERGER, DELETE: THE VIRTUE OF FORGETTING IN THE
DIGITAL AGE 125 (2009).
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impedes judgment.
From the perspective of the person
remembered, . . . it denies development, and refuses to
acknowledge that all humans change all the time. By recalling
forever each of our errors and transgressions, digital memory
rejects our human capacity to learn from them, to grow and to
evolve.49
In the characteristically deadpan assessment of The Economist magazine,
“A perfect digital memory would probably be a pain, preserving unhappy
events as well as cherished ones.”50 Mayer-Schönberger poignantly asks,
“Do we want a future that is forever unforgiving because it is
unforgetting?”51
On the other hand, as the police and prosecutors involved in the
formulation of the Standards were right to often point out, the things some
would most like forgotten are the evidences of their victimization of others.
In the context of law enforcement access to records, we often must
remember and must access to keep us safe from those who would do harm.
It is this very difficult balance that the LEATPR Standards aim to enable:
permitting law enforcement reasonable access to keep us safe and
preventing unnecessary access to keep us secure.
II. Drafting the LEATPR Standards
Perhaps understandably, the American Bar Association conjures
different reactions in different people, including among attorneys.52 So it is
worth explaining the rigorous and inclusive drafting process of the
LEATPR Standards, which mirrors that of all of the ABA Standards for
Criminal Justice. First, in late 2006, a Task Force was appointed to begin
the drafting process. The chair was Michael Bender, then a Justice on, and
later the Chief Justice of, the Colorado Supreme Court, and I was of course
the Reporter. Together we would shepherd the Standards through the sixplus years of drafting. The members of the Task Force were two
prosecutors, two practicing attorneys, and three prominent academics, two
of whom (Christopher Slobogin and Andrew Taslitz) had very significant
49. Id.
50. Every Step You Take, ECONOMIST, Nov. 16, 2013, at 13.
51. MAYER-SCHÖNBERGER, supra note 48, at 4-5.
52. See, e.g., David Segal, For Law Schools, a Price to Play the A.B.A.’s Way, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 18, 2011, at BU1 (discussing controversy over the ABA’s law school
accreditation role); Adam Liptak, Legal Group’s Neutrality is Challenged, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
31, 2009, at A14 (discussing controversy over the ABA’s judicial screening role).
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standards drafting experience of their own, and the third of whom (Paul
Ohm) is a leading scholar on privacy in the information age. The Federal
Bureau of Investigation, the National Association of Criminal Defense
Lawyers, the National Legal Aid & Defender Association, and the U.S.
Department of Justice all appointed liaisons.
Because this was a new set of Standards, we had to start from the very
beginning, including reading existing standards and delimiting our scope.
Although the title page of the LEATPR Standards denotes them as a “Third
Edition,” this merely reflects that the ABA is currently in its third iteration
of its Criminal Justice Standards project.53 The LEATPR Standards have
no predecessor in the ABA Standards or in those written by other
organizations. Over the next three years, the Task Force met in person
eight times and corresponded many more times electronically, culminating
in a draft that in March of 2010 was sent to the nine-member Criminal
Justice Standards Committee. Like the Task Force, the Standards
Committee is to have balanced representation, and specifically aims to have
three prosecutors, three defense attorneys, and three academics and judges,
along with nonvoting liaisons from prosecutorial and defense
organizations.54
The draft transmitted to the Standards Committee was not unanimous, a
matter of significant concern because the ABA prefers to proceed by
unanimous, or at least overwhelming, consent whenever possible.55 The
goal of the Standards project has always been to create “balanced and
practical” recommendations that “reflect[] a consensus of the views of
representatives of all segments of the criminal justice system.”56
Fortunately, the Standards Committee was very ably led by Martin Marcus,
a judge on the New York Supreme Court.57 Judge Marcus and I are both
respectably stubborn, and our emails drafting various provisions would go
back and forth a substantial number of times (we neared running out of
reasonable colors to denote the most recent edits). But thanks to Judge
Marcus and the other members of the nine-member Standards Committee
(including the person who would become the chair before the drafting
process was complete, Judge Marcus’ judicial colleague Mark Dwyer), we
53. See Marcus, supra note 3, at 13 (explaining second and third editions).
54. Id. at 14.
55. See id. at 15.
56. Id. at 14.
57. In an often successful attempt to confuse people, the Supreme Court is New York’s
trial court of general jurisdiction. See Structure of the Courts, NYCOURTS.GOV (Feb. 15,
2012), http://www.nycourts.gov/courts/structure.shtml.
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came out of the Standards Committee with a unanimous draft in a little over
a year. We were substantially aided by a former prosecutor (Peter Pope of
New York) and a current prosecutor (Matthew Redle of Wyoming), who
were willing and able to carefully consider what prosecutors require to
fulfill their mission.
The next stage was the thirty-four-member ABA Criminal Justice
Section Council, where the Standards underwent two “readings,” which
provided full days to consider and amend their content. As will be no
surprise at this point, that Council was broadly representative of the
criminal justice system, and prior to the Council’s consideration the draft
was widely circulated to other interested parties and persons.58 Again we
were fortunate to have good leadership, this time by practitioner Janet
Levine, and so, with modification, the Standards were approved for
consideration by the ABA House of Delegates. It was during this stage,
however, that I believe the two most unfortunate drafting decisions were
made, both of which are discussed later in this paper (the expanded grand
jury carve-out and the constitutional jurisprudence carve-out).
The draft was once more circulated to interested parties, and the ABA
House of Delegates considered and approved the black letter standards on
February 6, 2012. I then turned to writing the final commentary, and that
commentary was approved by the Standards Committee in March of 2013,
thus completing the twenty-fifth volume in the ABA Standards for Criminal
Justice, Law Enforcement Access to Third Party Records. Hopefully, in
time, this volume will enjoy the wide circulation and use that other volumes
have experienced.59
III. Introducing the LEATPR Standards
As part of the Standards Commentary I drafted a complete
Introduction,60 and elsewhere I have introduced and applied the LEATPR
Standards to the topic of location tracking.61 I will not seek to replicate that
full introduction here, but provide a condensed version for those new to the
Standards. For convenient reference, the black letter is included as an
Appendix to this volume.
58. See Marcus, supra note 3, at 15.
59. See id. at 10-13; 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 1.3(f) (3d ed.
2007).
60. LEATPR STANDARDS, supra note 2, at 1-16.
61. Stephen E. Henderson, Real-Time and Historic Location Surveillance After United
States v. Jones: An Administrable, Mildly Mosaic Approach, 103 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 803 (2013).
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The LEATPR Standards relate to law enforcement investigatory access
to, and storage and disclosure of, records maintained by institutional third
parties.62 In other words, they address government agents seeking to
acquire evidence from existing records to be used in the detection,
investigation, or prevention of crime. Because different constitutional
principles govern, because different interests predominate, and simply as a
matter of not tackling more than could responsibly be completed in a single
iteration, the Standards do not address access for purposes of national
security,63 civil investigation,64 or criminal prosecution.65 The Standards
also do not address records access from an individual not acting as a
business entity (e.g., police acquiring a letter written to a friend from that
friend),66 and do not address an institutional third party “deciding of its own
initiative and volition to provide information to law enforcement.”67 The
Standards also do not address acquisition of information contemporaneous
with its generation or transmission, because such “wiretapping” is already
the province of other Standards.68 Finally, and more questionably, the
62. My text here is adapted from the LEATPR Standards Introduction. See LEATPR
STANDARDS, supra note 2, at 5-11.
63. STANDARD 25-2.1(a).
64. See STANDARD 25-2.1(b) commentary.
65. STANDARD 25-2.1(b). For purposes of the Standards, “criminal prosecution”
follows the federal Sixth Amendment trigger, meaning the initiation of adversary judicial
proceedings. See id.
66. STANDARD 25-2.1(d).
67. STANDARD 25-2.1(f)(ii). Not only is this an inherent limitation in Criminal Justice
Standards, but the government is unique:
[A] focus on government activity reflects the reality that only the government
exercises the power to compel disclosure of information and to impose civil
and criminal penalties for noncompliance. Only the government collects and
uses information free from market competition and consumer preferences.
When dealing with the government, individuals have no opportunity to express
their expectations of privacy by choosing to do business elsewhere or by not
engaging in transactions at all. We, like the framers of our Constitution,
recognize that in the government context, the law alone provides—or should
provide—protection for those expectations.
DEP’T OF DEF. TECH. & PRIVACY ADVISORY COMM., SAFEGUARDING PRIVACY IN THE FIGHT
AGAINST TERRORISM 24 (2004), available at http://www.fredhcate.com/Publications/TAP
AC_Report%20Final.pdf.
68. See STANDARD 25-2.1(e); see also ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE,
ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE SECTION A: ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE OF PRIVATE
COMMUNICATIONS (3d ed. 2001); ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, ELECTRONIC
SURVEILLANCE SECTION B: TECHNOLOGICALLY-ASSISTED PHYSICAL SURVEILLANCE (3d ed.
1999).
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Standards do not address records access via a grand jury subpoena or a
“functionally equivalent prosecutorial subpoena,”69 a topic I address in the
next section of this article.
Part I of the Standards provides definitions, Part II delimits the
Standards’ scope, and Part III articulates the core governing principles.
Parts IV, V, and VI then provide the substantive recommendations, Part IV
governing the categorization and protection of information, Part V the
access to records, and Part VI record retention, maintenance, and
disclosure. Part VII then provides accountability for those substantive
recommendations.
In many ways, Part IV is the heart of the Standards. A decision maker,
often a legislature but also potentially a court or an administrative agency,
first determines the level of privacy for a given category of information.70
For example, should banking transactions be considered highly private,
moderately private, minimally private, or not private?71 The Standards
provide four important criteria that should be considered in making this
determination, in addition to considering the relevance of present and
developing technology.72 The Standards do not, however, suggest a
particular answer, thus respecting local circumstances, changing needs, and
the necessarily difficult nature of this inquiry. The four privacy criteria
consider, in a nutshell, the reason for and societal importance of the transfer
to the third party, the personal nature of the information, whether such
information is accessible and accessed by others, and existing law.73 Once
69. STANDARD 25-2.1(c).
70. STANDARD 25-4.1.
71. Why four categories (essentially large, medium, small, or nothing at all) instead of
three or five? Obviously there is no magic number; increasing the number of categories
increases nuance but sacrifices administrability. For a thoughtful defense of using some sort
of categorical system, as opposed to a continuum, see Marc Jonathan Blitz, Third Party
Records Protection on the Model of Heightened Scrutiny; 66 OKLA. L. REV. 747, 754-61
(2014). But see generally Thomas P. Crocker, Ubiquitous Privacy, 66 OKLA. L. REV. 791
(2014) (questioning whether a categorical system will ineffectually protect privacy).
72. STANDARD 25-4.1.
73. Id. In full, the four criteria are the extent to which
(a) the initial transfer of such information to an institutional third party is
reasonably necessary to participate meaningfully in society or in commerce, or
is socially beneficial, including to freedom of speech and association;
(b) such information is personal, including the extent to which it is intimate
and likely to cause embarrassment or stigma if disclosed, and whether outside
of the initial transfer to an institutional third party it is typically disclosed only
within one’s close social network, if at all;
(c) such information is accessible to and accessed by non-government
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this degree of privacy is determined, it sets a threshold level of protection:
highly private records—meaning those that contain highly private
information—are highly protected, moderately private records are
moderately protected, etc.74 Absent consent,75 emergency aid, or exigent
circumstances76; consistent with the law of privilege77; and absent any
greater constitutional protection78; the Standards provide that law
enforcement should be permitted to access a highly protected record via a
warrant supported by probable cause.79
For moderately protected
information, access should require a court order supported by reasonable
suspicion or, if the legislature or other decision maker so chooses, a court
order supported by relevance or issued pursuant to a prosecutorial
certification.80 Access to minimally protected information should require a
prosecutorial or agency determination of relevance.81 And access to
unprotected information should be permissible for any legitimate law
enforcement purpose.82 Although the privacy of a category of information
alone sets this threshold, there may be circumstances in which that
threshold makes it too difficult to solve otherwise solvable crime. In that
case, the legislature or other decision maker may, thinking also of the
privacy implications, consider reducing the level of protection
accordingly.83
The Standards also provide for access to inclusive bodies of de-identified
records (that is, records not linkable through reasonable efforts to an
identifiable person) when law enforcement has reason to conduct data

persons outside the institutional third party; and
(d) existing law, including the law of privilege, restricts or allows access to
and dissemination of such information or of comparable information.
Id. For a modified approach drawing insights from constitutional jurisprudence outside of
the Fourth Amendment (e.g., considering rational basis, intermediate scrutiny, and strict
scrutiny with its narrow tailoring requirement), see generally Blitz, supra note 71.
74. STANDARD 25-4.2(a).
75. STANDARD 25-5.1.
76. STANDARD 25-5.4.
77. STANDARD 25-5.3(c).
78. STANDARD 25-2.2.
79. STANDARD 25-5.3(a)(i).
80. STANDARD 25-5.3(a)(ii).
81. STANDARD 25-5.3(a)(iii).
82. STANDARD 25-5.3(d).
83. STANDARD 25-4.2(b). For an argument that there should be an analogous provision
that would provide greater protection to otherwise minimally protected information in
certain privacy-crucial contexts, see Crocker, supra note 71, at 810.
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mining.84 Finally, if the record is highly or moderately protected, law
enforcement should typically provide notice to the focus of the record, but
that notice can be, and often will be, delayed.85
The Commentary includes examples applying the Standards to a
hypothetical park shooting and then to a bank computer hack.86 In another
article, I apply them to location tracking,87 and in this volume, Susan
Freiwald applies them to cell-site location records.88 The Standards
recognize that a consensus concerning law enforcement access to records is
still developing, but also acknowledge the need to appropriately strike a
delicate balance between law enforcement’s legitimate need for access to
records and the privacy interests of the subjects of those records. By setting
forth privacy criteria and articulating a framework, the Standards will assist
legislatures and other deliberative bodies in carrying out this critical task.
IV. Improving the LEATPR Standards
I will allow the excellent symposium papers to make their own
arguments and contributions, other than dropping the occasional footnote
where I have been unable to resist noting their insights. I do not want to
detract from them, nor at this early stage attempt to contribute to them. Not
only will they be valuable to those seeking to implement the Standards, but
they are valuable more generally to theorizing and developing this body of
law. For example, one of the benefits of the Standards project has been to
reveal, or at least to highlight, some critical uncertainties in the core
concepts of relevance, reasonable suspicion, and probable cause.89
Additionally, in several years, with the passage of new events and new law
it will come time to update the Standards, and these papers, and future riffs
upon them, will be invaluable.
84. STANDARD 25-5.6. For an application of these Standards to the National Security
Agency’s bulk collection of communications metadata, see Slobogin, supra note 45, 735-40.
85. STANDARD 25-5.7.
86. LEATPR STANDARDS, supra note 2, at 11-16.
87. Henderson, supra note 61, at 815-21, 826-31.
88. Susan Freiwald, Some Light in the Darkness: How LEATPR Standards Guide
Legislators in Regulating Law Enforcement Access to Cell Site Location Records, 66 OKLA.
L. REV. 875, 908-17 (2014). Professor Freiwald has not only been a key voice in the
academic debate, but has participated in the principal federal litigations.
89. See generally Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Big Data Distortions: Exploring the Limits
of the ABA LEATPR Standards, 66 OKLA. L. REV. 831, 844-53 (2014); Slobogin, supra note
45; Andrew E. Taslitz, Cybersurveillance Without Restraint? The Meaning and Social Value
of the Probable Cause and Reasonable Suspicion Standards in Governmental Access to
Third-Party Electronic Records, 103 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 839 (2013).
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For now, I will content myself with making several points of drafting
history.
A. The Investigative Grand Jury
The LEATPR Standards exempt not only the federal grand jury from
their scope, and not only similar investigative state grand juries, but more
broadly “access to records via a grand jury subpoena, or in jurisdictions
where grand juries are typically not used, a functionally equivalent
prosecutorial subpoena.”90 This language leaves two questions, one of
which is at least partially answered in the Commentary, and one of which is
not: What does this mean, and where did it come from?
As for what the exception means, the Commentary first describes the
historic, permissive jurisprudence relating to the federal investigative grand
jury; describes the reasons to question the continued vitality of that
permissive jurisprudence; and then explains as follows:
There was robust debate on these topics during the drafting of
these Standards. Ultimately, however, these Standards are in
accordance with the historic treatment, including acknowledging
a longstanding alternative in some jurisdictions where grand
juries are typically not used.
Legislatures, courts, and
administrative agencies should be careful, however, to strictly
cabin this exception to means for which (1) there is historical
practice that has not been discredited and that remains relevantly
applicable, and (2) that historical practice includes privacy
safeguards equivalent to those of the federal grand jury.91
That Commentary is the best indication I can give of what a
“functionally equivalent prosecutorial subpoena” would be, because the
construct is a creation of the ABA Criminal Justice Section Council. My
goal in drafting the Commentary language was to remain true to the
Council’s desire, while also to prevent this exception from being too
broadly read, and thereby misread.
Where did this language come from? In other words, why generate this
seemingly ill-defined and novel category? Presumably like many others
before us, we struggled with what to make of the investigatory grand jury.
As a Task Force, we chose to remain true to the reality of grand jury
subpoenas in operation and therefore treated a grand jury subpoena as

90. STANDARD 25-2.1(c).
91. STANDARD 25-2.1(c) commentary.
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equivalent to any other prosecutorial subpoena, meaning it would suffice to
access only minimally protected information. This would certainly work a
significant change in the current law, but it is a change that, in my mind,
would be beneficial. Blind continuation of a historical anomaly calls to
mind Oliver Wendell Holmes’ famous assertion:
It is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that
so it was laid down in the time of Henry IV. It is still more
revolting if the grounds upon which it was laid down have
vanished long since, and the rule simply persists from blind
imitation of the past.92
Whatever role the grand jury may retain as a bulwark against
government oppression, it does not play that role when an assistant U.S.
Attorney issues a subpoena.
However, when our Task Force draft reached the Standards Committee,
members almost immediately identified our treatment of the grand jury
subpoena as a political nonstarter, meaning that any such change to the
much-reverenced federal grand jury would not ultimately see the light of
day. So, we added the grand jury subpoena as an option to access records
containing highly protected information, thus effectively equating the
subpoena to a warrant. This might have been too strong, as even current
muddled jurisprudence does not equate the two, at least where non-records
evidence is at issue and thus courts do not feel hemmed by the third party
doctrine.93 In any event, while the Standards Committee draft permitted a
grand jury subpoena to suffice for all records, no matter the level of
privacy, we did not include any language permitting a “functional
equivalent” to also suffice.
During the first Reading before the Section Council, a council member
objected to this favored status on the grounds that a grand jury subpoena is
“grand jury” in name only, raising the same objection that had won the day
before the Task Force. The resolution was to exempt grand jury subpoenas
from the Standards altogether. Grand jury subpoenas would now be exempt
from the Standards via Part II (the scope provisions), meaning the
Standards simply say nothing about grand jury subpoenas. This was
seemingly the only way to both give deference to the historically favored
status of this instrument and to recognize that in practice the grand jury
92. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 469
(1897).
93. See, e.g., United States v. Thomas, 736 F.3d 54, 60 (1st Cir. 2013) (rejecting a grand
jury subpoena for a buccal swab).
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subpoena is issued at the discretion of a prosecutor. At least this was the
only way that could politically survive. Grand jury subpoenas were sui
generis—one of a kind—and the Standards therefore did not speak to them.
While that was probably a wise move, at the second Council Reading we
added the nebulous “functional equivalent” language without, in my mind,
anyone really understanding or appreciating its scope. This was one of the
few times in the drafting process where I felt a change was made without
due deliberation. Fortunately, I do not expect it to be very significant given
the desire to limit it to federal-grand-jury-like proceedings, but nor do I
think it was a helpful addition given the confusion it might engender and
the potential for misinterpretation.
B. The Court Constitutional Carve-Out
Just like I worry that the nebulous grand jury carve-out might be
misinterpreted, I regret another change also made by the Section Council.
Indeed, if misunderstood, this change is more likely to have serious
deleterious consequences.
As the Standards were drafted in the Task Force and then the Standards
Committee, we always had three audiences in mind: courts engaged in
constitutional decision making, legislatures enacting law, and agencies
promulgating rules. Not only was constitutional adjudication central
because the scholarship undergirding the Standards was largely derived
from constitutional appellate decisions, but its importance was reinforced
by the leadership of our chair, Michael Bender, Chief Justice of the
Colorado Supreme Court. It was clear to all of us that courts are very much
in need of guidance in making the difficult determinations of precisely what
constitutional protection to provide various types of third party information.
Of course, statutory and administrative requirements will sometimes differ
from the constitutional floor, but all three require a framework for making
these decisions and that framework is what the Standards provide.
Unfortunately, when we reached the Section Council, we encountered
the view that it was not the province of the ABA Criminal Justice Standards
to inform constitutional decision making. Thus, the first of our three
intended audiences shrunk to “courts that may act in a supervisory
capacity,” primarily meaning those state courts empowered to craft
common law.94 Clearly this is not to say that courts engaged in
constitutional interpretation will not find much of use in our Standards.
Indeed, such a claim is impossible given the genesis of, for example, our
94. STANDARD 25-3.4.
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privacy factors in state constitutional law.95 But the carve-out could well
unintentionally discourage courts from using the Standards, which could
severely stunt their growth. I can only hope that will not prove to be the
case.96
C. National Security
The LEATPR Standards do not relate to records access for purposes of
national security, meaning an investigation of a foreign power or an agent
thereof.97 Previous sets of Standards have made a similar carve-out,98 and it
makes good sense given the different governing constitutional principles
and government needs, and the practicalities of not knowing what national
security surveillance takes place given a lack of necessary clearances and
the required “need to know.”99
However, it is worth noting that our preliminary decision as a Task Force
was actually to the contrary: we would address government access both for
purposes of law enforcement and national security, and we looked to
educate ourselves about both. As I wrote in an early internal memorandum,
“Not only is the line between the two becoming increasingly difficult to
draw, but national security surveillance since the attacks of September 11,
2001, makes clear that such acquisition is both important and potentially
subject to abuse.”100 Ultimately, however, it would simply have been
overwhelming to consider them both together in the first instance,
especially given the different governing law.
D. Human Development and Dignity
Even for scholars who, like myself, are largely content with a control
theory of information privacy, we ultimately tie its benefits to core notions

95. See STANDARD 25-3.4 commentary.
96. For a view that any standards will fail absent an even stronger tie to the
Constitution, meaning an argument that they require a claim of constitutional necessity, see
generally David Gray, The ABA Standards for Criminal Justice: Law Enforcement Access to
Third Party Records: Critical Perspectives from a Technology-Centered Approach to
Quantitative Privacy, 66 OKLA. L. REV. 919 (2014).
97. STANDARD 25-2.1(a).
98. See STANDARD 25-2.1(a) commentary at n. 76.
99. Of course, thanks to Edward Snowden we now know much more about NSA
surveillance than we did during the drafting process.
100. Memorandum from Stephen E. Henderson, Professor, University of Oklahoma
College of Law, to LEATPR Task Force (May 29, 2007) (on file with author).
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of personal identity, development, autonomy, and dignity.101 American law
tends to be wary of such language, however, and that played out during the
drafting of the Standards. The Task Force draft included as a general
principle (what is now Standard 25-3.3) that law enforcement acquisition of
records “can infringe the privacy of those whose information is contained in
the records, chill information transfers, and thereby diminish human
development, dignity, and freedom of speech and association.”102 The
Standards Committee eliminated the reference to human development and
dignity, but ultimately did add helpful, if less encompassing, language in its
place: “Law enforcement acquisition of records maintained by institutional
third parties can infringe the privacy of those whose information is
contained in the records; chill freedoms of speech, association, and
commerce; and deter individuals from seeking medical, emotional, physical
or other assistance for themselves or others.”103
E. Probable Cause of What?—Or, the Object of the Search
As Christopher Slobogin develops in his contribution to this volume,
there are significant uncertainties in applying the traditional concepts of
relevance, reasonable suspicion, and probable cause.104 He focuses in
particular on uncertainties with respect to how evidential the “object” that
the government is seeking must be: must it be contraband, a fruit of crime
or an instrumentality or crime, can it be “mere evidence,” or can it be
anything that might lead to evidence of guilt? Although these vagaries
were briefly discussed at various stages of the Standards’ drafting, we
ultimately made no concerted attempt to resolve them. Thus, for example,
for highly protected records the Standards require “a judicial determination
that there is probable cause to believe the information in the record contains
or will lead to evidence of crime.”105 As I describe elsewhere, the italicized
language was added during the second reading before the Criminal Justice
Section Council for a relatively tangential reason and with little
discussion.106

101. For a discussion of these benefits and their tie to privacy, see Crocker, supra note
71, at 794-800.
102. LEATPR Task Force, ABA Standards for Criminal Justice: Government Access to
Records: Third Parties and Privacy 19 (Jan. 15, 2010) (on file with author).
103. STANDARD 25-3.3.
104. See generally Slobogin, supra note 45.
105. STANDARD 25-5.2(a)(i) (emphasis added); see also STANDARD 25-5.3(a)(i).
106. See Henderson, supra note 61, at 821-23.
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Slobogin is particularly concerned about justificatory standards that
permit access to anything that might aid “an investigation.”107 For example,
imagine that access to phone records requires reasonable suspicion, defined
as a moderate chance. There is a significant difference between the
following: (1) demonstrating a substantial chance that person ‘X’ is a meth
dealer, and therefore positing a moderate chance that his phone records are
relevant to the investigation because he might have contacted known drug
offenders; and (2) demonstrating a substantial chance that person ‘X’ is a
meth dealer, and demonstrating a moderate chance that his phone records
contain evidence of crime by, say, an informant’s explanation that X set up
his deals via telephone.108 In other words, when the Standards use “relevant
to an investigation,” are they merely meaning to lower the required
quantum of suspicion, say from forty percent for probable cause to thirty
percent for reasonable suspicion to fifteen percent for relevance? Or are
they also meaning to change the “object” of that suspicion, requiring only
connection to the investigation as opposed to locating evidence of crime?
Other than for de-identified records, where different language is used, I
believe it was the former, meaning merely a lesser quantum of suspicion.
Thus, during the drafting it was pointed out that the Stored
Communications Act requires relevance “to an ongoing criminal
investigation” as part of its reasonable suspicion standard,109 and that such
language was not thought to work any expansion in theory or practice. And
it is possible that when it comes to a quantum of suspicion as low as that of
relevance, there is little to no practical difference regardless: if phone
records are relevant to some meth investigations, they are ipso facto
relevant to this one.
Nonetheless, a jurisdiction opting for one of the lesser LEATPR
Standards protections for records containing moderately protected
information should take note of the potential breadth of the relevance
standard.110 Indeed, perhaps the most important specific contribution of
Slobogin’s paper is its critique of the Standards’ inclusion of anything less
than reasonable suspicion as a default protection for moderately protected
records.111 More generally, as Slobogin, Taslitz, and Ferguson have all

107.
(b), (c).
108.
109.
110.
111.

See Slobogin, supra note 45, at 735-40; see also STANDARD 25-5.2(a)(iii), (a)(iv),
See Slobogin, supra note 45, at 743.
18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) (2012).
See STANDARD 25-5.3(a)(ii) (permitting a choice).
See Slobogin, supra note 45, at 743-46.
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begun to develop, this will be an area of continuing interest in criminal
procedure.
V. Conclusion
Between the emergence of big data and the revelations of Edward
Snowden, it is difficult today to avoid talk of access to records. For those
of us who have been involved in this area of the law for many years,
including in the drafting of the ABA LEATPR Standards, that increased
public consciousness is a good thing, and hopefully the Standards will be
put to good use and, where found wanting, improved upon. This
symposium is certainly a good start for the academic component.
In conclusion, I briefly note two areas I think will be of increasing
importance in the coming years. First, as big data teaches what can be
learned from existing data gathered for limited purposes, law enforcement
will be inclined to combine and mine the vast amounts of information it
collects.112 As merely an isolated but telling example, when a cellphone is
reported stolen in New York City, the police routinely acquire the phone’s
calling information going forward.113 Regardless of the statutory legality of
this acquisition,114 and regardless of its utility in solving the theft or
robbery, there is much less justification for dumping all of the records so
obtained into a growing database. Yet that is precisely what police are
doing.115 So, future iterations of the LEATPR Standards might want to
spend more time thinking about imposing use restrictions on law
enforcement data, an issue that Harold Krent very ably raised years ago but
whose time might have finally come for both constitutional and statutory
law.116 Now that we store so much more information to begin with, and
that big data analytics make analysis of that data, and analysis of old, preexisting data, powerful and telling, we need use controls more than ever
112. Andrew Ferguson has correctly pointed out that the concept of mining data for new
revelations, including by police, is hardly new. See Ferguson, supra note 89, at 835-36. But
he likewise recognizes and emphasizes the significance of the advances in analytics that we
refer to as big data. See id. at 839-40.
113. Joseph Goldstein, City Is Amassing Trove of Cellphone Logs, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 27,
2012, at A25.
114. More details would be necessary to ascertain its legality under, for example, the
federal Pen/Trap Statute (18 U.S.C. § 3121) or the Stored Communications Act (18 U.S.C. §
2703).
115. See Goldstein, supra note 113.
116. See generally Harold J. Krent, Of Diaries and Data Banks: Use Restrictions Under
the Fourth Amendment, 74 TEX. L. REV. 49 (1995).

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol66/iss4/2

2014]

OUR RECORDS PANOPTICON & THE ABA STANDARDS 723

before. Big data analytics can be incredibly useful to law enforcement,
including to officers on the beat,117 but will be unduly invasive of privacy
unless constitutionally or statutorily restricted.
Finally, I continue to become increasingly convinced that we need better
dialogue, including law enforcement being more forthcoming regarding
what records access it conducts and for what purposes. While I have
written about this before,118 two more recent data points have come to my
attention. We did not know until recently that AT&T has for the past
twenty-six years maintained an enormous database of phone records
tracking every call that passes through its switches.119 One of the reasons
the database remained secret for so long is because when law enforcement
uses that database it never admits such access in court or otherwise.
Instead, it whitewashes the investigation either by omitting all mention of
the phone records, or by re-accessing the same information a second time
using a different method.120 That sort of deception might be thought
beneficial to snare unknowing criminals, but it also prevents any discussion
about the privacy implications for the innocent.
Another point of records access that some law enforcement would prefer
to keep under wraps is obtaining location information from cell phone
providers, including the use of “tower dumps” that reveal every phone near
a certain cell tower in a given time period.121 When USA Today recently
issued records requests and learned that one quarter of responding law
enforcement agencies have obtained information from cell tower dumps,
some agencies refused to respond on the ground that “criminals or terrorists
could use the information to thwart important crime-fighting and

117. See Wendy Ruderman, New Tool for Police Officers: Records at Their Fingertips,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 12, 2013, at A17 (describing “the newest tool in the Police Department’s
crime-fighting arsenal: a smartphone”). According to Ruderman, “The technology offers
extraordinary levels of detail about an individual, including whether the person has ever
been a passenger in a motor vehicle accident, a victim of a crime or in one instance, a drug
suspect who has been known by the police to hide crack cocaine in his left sock.” Id.
(internal punctuation omitted).
118. See Henderson, supra note 61, at 835-38.
119. Scott Shane & Colin Moynihan, Drug Agents Use Vast Phone Trove, Eclipsing
N.S.A.’s, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 1, 2013, at A1.
120. Id. (including the law enforcement slides, which are available at Synopsis of the
Hemisphere Project, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 1, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2013/
09/02/us/hemisphere-project.html).
121. For more on cell tower dumps, including their analysis under the Standards, see
Henderson, supra note 61, at 803-08, 815-21, 823-31.
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surveillance techniques.”122 Agencies have been similarly coy regarding
their use of devices that mimic cell phone towers in order to track phone
location in real time.123 Thus, in one recent court opinion it is reported that
police “did not want to obtain a search warrant because they did not want to
reveal information about the technology they used to track the cell phone
signal.”124 According to the prosecutor, the police had a nondisclosure
agreement with the company owning the technology.125 And per the
testimony of an investigator, “[W]e prefer that alternate legal methods be
used, so that we do not have to rely upon the equipment to establish
probable cause, just for not wanting to reveal the nature and methods.”126
Highly weaponized paramilitary police have taken a page from our military,
but when they start to articulate the refrains of national security, clearly
policing has gone too far. Whatever benefits there are to nondisclosure, in
the context of ordinary policing there are at least comparable benefits to
robust and honest discussion.
The ABA LEATPR Standards are, at the very least, an important step in
the right direction. They are the product of over six years of discussion,
dialogue, debate, and compromise, and are the first set of standards to guide
legislatures, courts, and agencies in making the difficult decisions of how
best to regulate law enforcement access to ubiquitous and varied third party
records. It was my privilege to serve as their Reporter and to convene this
symposium to continue moving the ball forward.

122. John Kelly, Cellphone Data Spying: It’s Not Just the NSA, USA TODAY, Dec. 9,
2013, at A1.
123. See id.; see also Ellen Nakashima, Little-Known Surveillance Tool Raises Concerns
by Judges, Privacy Activists, WASH. POST, Mar. 28, 2013, at A3.
124. Thomas v. State, 127 So. 3d 658, 660 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013).
125. Id.
126. Id.
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